The Effect of Level of Provocation and Attributions About the Provoker on Aggression and Anger by Kremer, John F.
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
1976
The Effect of Level of Provocation and Attributions
About the Provoker on Aggression and Anger
John F. Kremer
Loyola University Chicago
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1976 John F. Kremer
Recommended Citation
Kremer, John F., "The Effect of Level of Provocation and Attributions About the Provoker on Aggression and Anger" (1976).
Dissertations. Paper 1602.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1602
THE EFFECT OF LEVEL OF PROVOCATION AND 
ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT THE PROVOKER 
ON AGGRESSION AND ANGER 
' 
by 
John F. Kremer 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of·Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 




I want to especially thank George McAdoo, director of clinical 
training, Indiana University Medical Center, for his significant 
contribution to this research. I appreciate the time he gave me and 
his many helpful suggestions. He was always willing to work with me 
and he understood the problems associated with doing a dissertation 
and gave me support when I needed it. I didn't expect as much as he 
~ 
was willing to give. 
I also want to thank my committee members from Loyola University 
of Chicago, Emil Posavac, Jim Johnson, and A1 DeWolfe, for helping me 
do my dissertation from a distance of 200 miles, for their suggestions 
concerning the pilot study, for helping me to make my points clearly, 
and especially for trying to help me meet a deadline. Also, a special 
thanks to Kathy McCaffrey for typing this dissertation and for doing 
the favors which I asked her. 
ii 
VITA 
The researcher, John Francis Kremer, is the son of John Thomas 
Kremer and Frances (Kirschner) Kremer. He was born on November 28, 
1944 in Cincinnati, Ohio. He was married to Marty Whitsett on June 2, 
1974. 
He received his elementary education in Cincinnati, Ohio, and 
St. Peters, Indiana. He went to high school at St. Meinrad, Indiana, 
r 
where he was graduated in 1962. He also attended St. Meinrad College 
where he was awarded the Bachelor of Arts degree in philosophy with a 
minor in chemistry in June, 1966. Be also received the degree of 
Master of Science in chemistry with a minor in mathematics from the 
University of Notre Dame in August, 1969. In June, 1974 be was 
awarded the degree of Master of Arts in psychology from Loyola 
University of Chicago. 
From 1969 to 1971, he taught high school chemistry and 
mathematics at the Latin School of Indianapolis and Our Lady of Grace 
Academy. He also did his clinical internship at Indianapolis, at the 
Indiana University Medical School from September, 1973 to September, 
1974. Presently, he is a member of the department of psychology at 
Indiana University, Purdue University, Indianapolis and a member of the 
department of psychiatry at the Indiana University Medical School with 
the rank of assistant professor. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................ 
vnA ......................................................... . 
LIST OP TABLES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................. 
CONTENTS OF APPENDICES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
REVIEW OF THE RELAT~ LITERATURE •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Dimensions of Angry Aggression •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Provocation Causes Angry Aggression ••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Techniques for Inducing Provocation and 
Measuring Aggression •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Effect of Reasonableness of Provocation 
~Aggression ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Interaction of Reasonableness and 
Provocation ••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Effect of Unreasonableness of Provocation 
on Aggression ....•.....•............. ~ ~ .•............•... 
Comparison of Two Theories of Aggression •••••••••••••••••• 
STATmfENT OF PURPOSE •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES ....................................... 
METHOD ...................................................... 
Subjects and Confederate •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Design ...•..•.•••..•.••.•..••.••.•.• • .•• · • • · • · • · • • • · · · • • · · 
Apparatus ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Procedute ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
RESULTS ..................................... ·• .............. . 
Effect of Provocat~on on Aggression ••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Effect of Attributions on Aggression •••••••••••••••••••••• 
Interactive Effect of Attribution and 
Provocation on Aggression ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 




























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(contd.) 
DISCUSSION •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••. • •••• 
Aggression Defined by the Zap Option 
Reasonable Attribution Determines the 
...................... 
Effect of Provocation on Aggression .~ ••••••••••••••••••• 
Reasonable Attribution Reduced Aggression 
for Questionnaire Studies but Not for 
Experimental Studies .................................... 
Inhibition Theory vs. Differential 
~ Cognitive Appraisal as Explanations 
of Aggression ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Possibilities for Future Experiments ...................... 
S'O!OfAllY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
REFERENCES .................................................. 
APPENDIX A .................................................. 
APPENDIX B .................................................. 
APPENDIX C ........•...•.••.•.....••.....•..........•••...... 
APPENDIX D ..........•.••..••.........••.•...........•..•...• 
APPENDIX E .................................................. 

















LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Mean Number of "Zaps" for Three Attribution 
Conditions at Two Levels of Provocation ••••••••••••••• 39 
2. Mean Pretest and Posttest Anger Scores for 
Three Attribution Conditions at Two Levels 
of Provocation .•.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 40 
3. ANOVA: Preplanned, Orthogonal Comparisons 
for "Zaps" .•••.....••••...••••••••.•••.••••...•..•••.• 44 
4. Mean Number of ~"zaps" in the Reasonable and 
Combined Unreasonable and Ambiguous Conditions 
at Two Levels of Provocation •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 45 
5. Mean Pretest and Posttest Anger Ratings for 
High and Low Aggressors ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. A Schematic of Inputs Used in Making 
Judgments about Aggression •••••••••••••••••••••••• _..... 6 · 
2. An Example of a Payoff Matrix for the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game................................ 14 
3. The Expected Mean Number of Zaps for 
Three Attribution Conditions at Two 
Levels of Provocation.................................. 29 
4. Mean Number of '"Zaps" for Two Attribution 
Conditions at Two Levels of Provocation................ 47 
5. Mean Number of "Zaps" in the Reasonable and 
Combined Unreasonable and Ambiguous 
Conditions at Two Levels of Provocation................ 48 
vii 
CONTENTS FOR APPENDICES 
Page 
APPENDIX A Choice and Payroll Sheet for Subjects 76 
APPENDIX B Statement of Informed Consent ••••••••••••••••• 78 
APPENDIX C Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist ••••••••••• 80 
APPENDIX D Postexperimental Questionnaire •••••••••••••••• 82 
APPENDIX E Material for Pilot Experiment ••••••••••••••••• 85 
, 
I. Instruct-ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
II. Situational Statements and Rating •••••••••••••••••••• 87 
III. Rank Order Rating.................................... 90 
IV. Feeling and Aggression Questionnaire ••••••••••••••••• 91 
APPENDIX F Pilot Data •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 96 
viii 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
The plethora of theories on aggression have emphasized many 
differing causes of aggression, such as: innate, unlearned aspects 
(Ardrey, 1966; Freud, 1920/1965; Lorenz, 1966); situational determinants 
(Berkowitz, 1965; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939); 
learned habits (Berkowitz, 1965); fantasy (Feshbach, 1955); modeling 
(Bandura & Walters, 1963); and reinforcement (Buss, 1971). Researchers 
have constructed as nany different definitions of aggression as they 
have hypothesized causes of aggression. MOst theorists' definitions of 
aggression are directly related to their causes of aggression. For 
example, Lorenz, who supports an innate, unlearned position, made the 
following statement regarding his book, On Aggression. "The subject 
of this book is aggression, that is to say the fighting instinct in 
beast and man which is directed against members of the same species" 
(p. ix). Buss (1971), who believes that people aggress because they 
were rewarded for aggressing, described an aggressor as a behavior 
modifier.· He stated, all varieties of aggression "share a single 
property: one individual delivers noxious stimuli to another. This 
definition of aggression makes it nearly equivalent to punishment" 
(p. 9). Since there is a relationship between theorists' causes of 
aggression and their definitions, it is not surprising to find that no 
one definition has had very wide appeal. 
An excellent point was made by Johnson (1972) and Tedeschi, 
Smith, and Brown (1974) that researchers haven't been able to agree 
1 
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on a definition of aggression because aggression is not a unitary 
concept. There is no single process or concept of aggression. The 
above discussion suggests that there are many different types of 
aggression which possibly correspond to the different causes of aggres-
sion. There is some general agreement in the literature (Berkowitz, 
1969; Buss, 1971; Tedeschi et al., 1974) for at least two different 
aggression mechanisms: angry and instrumental aggression. Angry 
aggression "is initiated by any anger-inducing stimuli: insult, attack, 
, 
of the presence of annoyers. These are cues for anger, which is 
followed by aggression, the intent of which is to make the victim suffer" 
(Buss, 1971, p. 10). Inherent in this discussion of angry aggression, 
there is the implicit assumption that increases in attack also lead to 
increases in anger (Berkowitz & Geen, 1966; Geen, 1968, 1970). 
Instrumental aggression "is initiated by either competition or a 
desired reinforcer's being possessed by another person. These are cues 
for cold-blooded (non-angry) aggression, the intent of which is to win 
the competition or acquire the reinforcer" (Buss, 1971, p. 10). Angry 
aggression is the focus for the remainder of this paper. 
Dimensions of Angry Aggression 
Within the research on angry aggression, definitions of aggres-
sion vary on three dimensions: (a) Is the behavior which is considered 
aggressive broad or narrow; (b) Is intent to harm another person essential 
or nonessential; (c) Is the action illegitimate or antinormative or 
unjustified or is this feature not important. (These dimensions are 
based on the work of Tedeschi et al., 1974.) 
Kane, Doerge, and Tedeschi (1973) determined that in considering 
. 3 
the necessary prerequisites for labeling an act as aggression, experi-
menters and subjects utilize different information when they label 
behavior. The definition of aggression will be subdivided into two 
sections: information used by experimenters and information used by 
subjects to define aggression. 
Experimenter's labeling. In regards to the first dimension, 
there has been a wide range of behavior which has been labeled aggres-
sion. Dollard et al. (1939) adopted a narrow definition. They stated, 
'~erbs such as destroy, damage, torment, retaliate, hurt, blow up, 
humiliate, insult, threaten, and intimidate refer to actions of an 
aggressive nature" (p. 10). Olweus (1973), on the other hand, believed 
that any type of discomfort caused by another's action should be called 
aggression. Tedeschi et al., (1974) presented an even broader 
definition. Aggression "involves constraint of another's behavioral 
alternatives." 
For the second dimension, intent, researchers have generally 
agreed that the intent to harm is necessary for an act to be considered 
aggression. The intent of a subject's aggressive behavior cannot be 
definitely determined. However, researchers feel assured that in 
certain controlled situations, subjects were acting with intent. In 
everyday situations it is generally agreed that intent cannot be as 
clearly identified. 
There are two common situations which are especially troublesome 
for researchers. First, it is generally acknowledged that accidents 
should not be defined as aggression. This could involve an additional 
determination of whether an event is an accident or not. Secondly, 
4 
most theorists do not label as aggressive the delivery of noxious 
stimuli when it is part of a social role, e.g., fixing a tooth or 
passing a sentence. But there are ambiguous situations., Is a father 
spanking his child because he is angry or because he feels it is his 
duty as a parent? 
For the third dimension, Kane et al. (1973) noted that 
experimenters consider an act to be aggression even if there was no 
indication that a subject was acting illegitimately. In fact, experi-
' 
menters label an act as aggression even if the subject was treating 
another person just as the other person had treated the subject. 
Subjects' labeling. Tedeschi et al. (1974) maintained that any 
act which constrains another's behavior alternatives and is perceived 
as intentionally detrimental and as illegitimate will be labeled 
aggression by subjects. The question is not whether the confederate 
really has the intent to do harm; rather it is whether the subject 
believes the confederate intends to do harm; and whether the subject 
judges the action to be illegitimate or antinormative. Kane et al. 
(1973) found that subjects must judge an act to be illegitimate (not 
justified by the situation) before they will label an act as aggressive 
and in this regard subjects differ from experimenters in their labeling 
process. 
Definition of terms. For the purposes of this study, "provo-
cation" is the word used to describe the experimenter's perception of 
the confederate's behavior toward the subject. In order for it to be 
labeled a provocation, two judgments are necessary: (a) the 
experimenter considered that the confederate's behavior limited the 
5 
subject's behavioral alternatives or caused the subject some dtscomfort 
and (b) the experimenter judged that the confederate intended to harm 
the subject. "Attack" will describe the subject's perception of the 
confederate's behavior toward the subject. In this case three judg-
ments are necessary for the subject to label the confederate's behavior 
as an attack. The subject judged (a) that the confederate limited his 
behavioral alternatives or caused him some discomfort; (b) that the 
confederate intended to harm him; and (c) that the confederate's 
~ ' behavior was illegitimate or unfair. "Aggression" will be used to 
describe the experimenter's perception of the subject's behavior towards 
the confederate, and again the experimenter must make the same two 
judgments noted above in order for the label, aggression, to apply. The 
experimenter believed (a) that the subject's action constrained the 
confederate's behavioral alternatives or caused him discomfort and (b) 
that the subject intended to harm the confederate. These three judg-
ments occur in the following order: the provocation occurs first, 
then the subject may perceive the provocation as an attack or not, and 
the subject may or may not aggress against the confederate (see 
Figure 1). 
There are three groups of factors which determine whether or 
not a subject will label the provocation as an attack. These factors 
are environmental information, internal cues, and personality styles 
or·traits (see Figure 1). This study will focus on environmental 
information as a determinant of aggression and of the subject's labeling 
of attack. Two pieces of information which influence a subject's 
judgments about illegitimacy of harm-intending acts are level of prior 
6 
Figure 1. A Schematic of Inputs Used in Making 
Judgments about Aggression. 
7 
provocation and the causes or reasons for the provoker's behavior. 
These two factors and their interrelation will be the primary focus for 
the remainder of this paper. 
Provocation Causes AngrY Aggression 
An extensive list of causes of angry aggression would include 
rude and unpleasant persons; threats to satisfaction of basic needs; 
arbitrariness of a frustrator's behavior; maliciousness of a frustrator; 
frustrations in an effort to gain status, security, and/or reputation; 
• 
, unreasonable demands; inability to retaliate; threat of provocation; 
insults; and despair (Fawcett, 1971; Singer, 1971). However, most of 
the research has centered on frustration and provocation as the two 
most important external or environmental causes of aggression. 
In the late 30's Dollard et al. (1939) put together a reactive 
conception of aggression. Initially, they stated, '~he occurrence of 
aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration 
and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to 
some form of aggression" (p. 2). Only two years later one of the 
authors 01iller, 1941) changed this initial formulation and stated that 
frustration can potentially produce a variety of different responses, 
one of which is aggression. It is now generally accepted that there 
are many different responses that people can make to frustration 
(Bilgard, Atkinson, & Atkinson, 1971). 
In the subsequent research on the frustration-aggression 
hypothesis, there has been a wide range of operational definitions of 
frustration. Frustration has been defined as an interruption of an 
ongoing task (Gentry, 1970), losing when in competition with another 
8 
person (Epstein & Taylor, 1967), a person's failure at teaching 
(Thompson, 1972), and provocation (Berkowitz, 1962). Considering 
these divergent definitions of frustration, it is understandable that 
there have been some studies which have supported the frustration-
aggression hypothesis and others which contradict it. 
There has been some clarification regarding the operational 
definition of frustration. As early as 1966, Buss maintained that 
frustration was a weak antecedent of aggression. He claimed that 
other researchers (Berkowitz, 1962) confounded frustration with provo-
cation and this is the reason these studies supported a frustration-
aggression hypothesis. Buss believed that it was the provocation which 
produced the aggression and found that verbal provocation led to 
aggression and frustration did not. 
Other studies have shown similar results. Gillespie (1961) 
and Geen and Berkowitz (1967) found that frustrated and insulted 
subjects aggressed more than frustration-only subjects; and Geen (1968) 
found that insulted subjects (provocation) aggressed more than 
frustrated subjects. The definitive study was done by Gentry (1970). 
He tested the effects of pure frustration, pure provocation (insult), 
and a combination of frustration plus provocation on subsequent 
aggression. Pure provocation produced more aggression than did a 
·combination of frustration plus provocation which in turn resulted in 
more aggression than pure frustration. From the above research there 
seems to be a consistent finding that attack·or frustration plus attack 
lead to increases in angry aggression. 
One study suggests that increases in pure frustration may lead 
9 
to increases in instrumental aggression. Thompson (1971) found that 
stronger frustration led to more aggression when aggression was effective 
in overcoming the frustration. Aggression in this experiment could be 
more specifically called instrumental aggression. 
There is some question in the literature over the type of 
relationship that exists between provocation and aggression. · Buss (1961) 
assumed that the tendency to aggress varied curvilinearly with the 
intensity of provocation. He believed that this was especially true 
, 
for physical provocation. Knott and Drost (1972) tried to test this 
hypothesis. They gave subjects a small, medium, or large number of 
shocks. The subjects were then given an opportunity to aggress by 
administering shock. They found a linear relationship between intensity 
of provocation and intensity of aggression. They believed that the 
large number of shocks was intended to be.a high level of provocation 
but was actually a moderate level. Epstein and Taylor (1967) and 
Taylor (1967) also found a linear relationship between intensity of 
provocation and intensity of aggression. The evidence supports the 
hypothesis that there is a linear relationship between provocation and 
aggression. Thus, hypothesis 1 is that high provocation will result in 
more aggression than low provocation. However, experimenters do not 
and, naturally, will not deliver high provocation. Thus, the relationship 
appears linear for the range of provocations acceptable in laboratory 
research. 
As was mentioned above, the hypotheses regarding the causes of 
aggression are directly related to the operational definitions of 
provocation and aggression. Therefore, techniques of inducing 
10 
provocation and measuring aggression will be examined. 
Techniques for Inducing Provocation and Measuring Aggression 
Buss Machine. In a typical experiment using the Buss Machine 
(Geen & Berkowitz, 1966), the experimenter outlined the experiment as 
designed to measure performance in a problem solving task. The subject 
was told that he would be given a difficult problem to solve and his 
solution would then be judged by another subject (actually an accomplice 
or confederate), who communicated his evaluation by supposedly giving 
, 
the subject a number of electric shocks ranging from 1 to 10. The 
confederate actually gave the subject one or seven shocks, no provo-
cation and high provocation respectively. The subject was later given 
a chance to shock the confederate. These shocks were administered at 
the subject's discretion. One shock indicated that the subject judged 
the accomplice's solution to be very good and 10 indicated that he 
judged the solution to be very poor. The amount of aggression was 
measured by the number and intensity of shock which the subject 
administered. 
Ethically, the Buss model has come under heavy criticism because 
the pain administered is a noxious stimulus and because a high degree 
of deception is necessary. In regards to the former, it is clear that 
subjects incur some physical and psychological stress. The degree of 
stress which is ethically tolerable is open for debate. There are no 
clear answers. Almost everyone agrees (Crano & Brewer, 1973) that no 
potentially permanent physical or psychological harm is permissible to 
human subjects. Gergen (1973) has called on psychologists to use their 
mental energy to do research on the harmful effects of various 
11 
strategies. Until it can be established that questionable research 
strategies are not harmful, other potentially less harmful methods to 
study aggression should be examined. 
Sullivan and Deiker (1973) pooled the opinions of psychologists. 
and students in universities on the use of deception and pain in 
psychological experiments. They gave students and professors four 
experiments. All experiments were described by an identical cover 
story in which subjects were asked to volunteer for an experiment that 
would involve learning a list of nonsense syllables. They were then told 
the true nature of the experiment. One of the experiments examined 
pain endurance and was described as one in which the volunteers would 
receive electric shocks that other students had said were "definitely 
uncomfortable, but by no means unbearable." Seventy-two percent of 
psychologists and 51% of the students said that the deception in this 
study was unethical. Forty-seven percent of psychologists and 18% of 
students thought that it was unethical to use shock. Fifty-seven 
percent of psychologists and 56% of students thought that the use of 
shock was not justified. Although this hypothetical experiment differs 
from the Buss-type experiment, there are many similarities in the degree 
of deception and the degree of pain endured. Thus, the opinions of the 
professors and students should be considered in ethically evaluating 
the Buss-type paradigm. 
Crano and Brewer (1973) stated that the deliberate misrepre-
sentation of the details of an experiment which is implicit in a cover 
story is "undeniably" a violation of interpersonal trust and respect. 
Whether this is justified for the sake of science is also open for 
7 
debate. From another standpoint, Orne (1962), Kelman (1967), Argyris 
(1968), and Schultz (1969) argued against the use of deception because 
the behavior of the subject is not normal since it is a well known fact 
that psychologists use deception in experiments. They recommend that 
scientists enlist the cooperation and collaboration of the subject 
rather than fooling or manipulating htm. The above comments suggest 
that research on aggression should utilize other behavioral measures 
in order to limit the use of deception and the use of pain as a noxious 
• 
stimulus until it is proven nonharmful. 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game. A partial review of the literature on 
aggression produced only one strategy to measure aggression which sub-
stantially differed from the Buss model, which did not use shock, which 
minimized deception, and which could be used with adults. Berger and 
Tedeschi (1969) used a modified version of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
as a behavioral measure of aggression with children. Anchor and Cross 
(1974) revised this strategy slightly for use with adults. This game 
is a conflict situation in which each of two players must select one 
of two strategies (cooperation or competition) without any knowledge 
of the other player's selection. The goal for a person playing this 
game is to win as much money or as many points as he can. By choosing 
one option a person is generally cooperating with the other player; and 
by choosing the other option, he is competing_. The Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game is a non-zero-sum or mixed-motive game. In constant-sum games, 
which the Prisoner's Dilemma Game is not, the total payoff to the two 
players is always a constant. The larger the payoff to· one player, the 
smaller is the payoff to the other. In nonconstant-sum or mixed-motive 
13 
games, the payoff varies. One combination of moves has a high payoff 
for both players. Another combination has the highest payoff for one 
player and the lowest payoff for the other player. The players have 
partially common and partially opposed interests. 
Since each player is given a choice between cooperating (C) and 
competing (D), this leads to four possible outcomes or payoff 
conditions, CC, CD, DC, DD. The payoffs are usually represented in 
a matrix (see Figure 2). The number in the upper half of the box refers 
to the payoff for person A and the lower half for person B. It can be 
readily seen that the highest payoff to both players is achieved when 
they both are cooperative. However, in many instances both people end 
up playing competitively which results in the lowest possible payoff 
for the two players. The cause and nature of this dilemma can be 
readily seen by looking at the analogy from which the game derived its 
name. 
Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The district 
attorney is certain that they are guilty of a specific crime, but 
he does not have adequate evidence to convict them at a trial. He 
points out to each prisoner that each has two alternatives: to 
confess to the crime the police are sure they have committed, or 
not to confess. ·If they both do not confess, then the district 
attorney states he will book them on some very minor trumped-up 
charge such as petty larceny and illegal possession of a weapon, 
and they will both receive minor punishment; if they both confess 
they will be prosecuted but he will recommend less than the most 
severe sentence; but if one confesses and the other does not, 
then the confessor will receive lenient treatment for turning 
state's evidence whereas the latter will get the book slapped 
at him (Luce & Raiffa, 1958, p. 95). 
The best outcome for both prisoners results ~f neither confesses (CC). 
But the best possible outcome for one person is achieved if he confesses 



















10 (T) 0 (P) 
Payoff Labels 
R • Reward 
T • Temptation 
S • Sucker 
P • Punishment 
Figure 2. An Example of a Payoff Matrix for the 
· Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Person A's 
payoff is in the upper half of the 
box. Person B's is in the lower half. 
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his own gain, the lowest payoff results (DD). 
In experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, one frequently 
used dependent measure is the percentage of competitive or cooperative 
choices. This measure was used by Berger and Tedeschi (1969) who 
also developed another dependent measure of aggression. After each 
seven trials of the game, they injected a zap option. One subject 
playing the game (actually, he was the only subject since the other 
player was a confederate) was given the opportunity to take $10 of 
r 
play money from the other person. A subject could not gain when he 
used the option because he was assessed a fee which ranged from $2 to 
$11. The subjects in this experiment were children and the money which 
they won was traded in for M & M candy at the end of the game. Anchor 
and Cross (1974) used the same procedure with adults except each dollar 
won could be redeemed for a penny. Berger and Tedeschi stated that the 
zap option was a ."behavioral response that can be unambiguously in-
terpreted as ha~intending aggression directed toward another person." 
The zap option restricts the outcome for the opponent by taking money 
away from him; and when the subject uses the option, he is intending 
to harm the opponent because there is no gain for the subject. 
Therefore, the zap option qualifies as an operational definition of 
aggression for expertmenters. 
The number of competitive responses is not clearly a measure of 
aggression as defined in this paper. The competitive response clearly 
causes the confederate harm (the lowest payoff). However, since the 
subject also obtains the highest possible payoff, the motivation of 
the subject cannot be clearly judged. Is he using the competitive 
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response to maximize his own gain (instrumental aggression) or to 
minimize the confederate's gain (angry aggression)? 
It is necessary to present a short review of the r,esearch which 
pertains to the use of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in the present 
experiment. In some studies one of the players' game strategy was 
determined by the experimenter. Such a predetermined strategy was used 
in this experiment in order to present each subject with the same 
situation. Various strategies have been used: a randomized strategy, 
a tit-for-tat strategy in which the experimenter selects the response 
which the subject gave on the previous trial, a progressively increasing 
cooperative strategy, etc. Since the strategy is not the area of concern 
for the present experiment, a randomized schedule was used. In this 
strategy the experimenter makes the same move for all subjects on the 
nth trial. The schedule is randomly predetermined according to a 
specified percentage of cooperative responses. MOst studies employ a 
random schedule using a 50% cooperative and 50% competitive ratio. 
Summers, Peirce, Olen, and Baranowski (1972) reported that most studies 
in this area have fo~d that the experimenter's overall strategy has 
had very little effect on subject's cooperative behavior. Oskamp (1971) 
in his review of the literature, found that big differences in strategy 
(80% cooperative compared to 20% cooperative) led to differences in 
cooperative behavior; but smaller differences (75% cooperative compared 
to'50% cooperative) did not. Thus within reasonable limits the 
percentage of cooperative responses which the experimenter uses in a 
randomized schedule is not a crucial variable in designing the 
experiment. 
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It has also been found that the values in the matrix affect 
cooperative behavior. Rapoport and Chammah (1965) used the following 
terms to describe the different outcomes in the matrix: reward (R), 
punishment (P), temptation (T), and sucker (S). In Figure 2, ~refers. 
to reward, ~to sucker, T to temptation, and!. to punishment. The 
relative values of the four outcomes influence the participants' 
behavior. Rapoport and Chammah reported that the index (R - P)/(T - S) 
positively correlated with cooperative behavior. Steele and Tedeschi 
r 
(1967) developed 208 different indexes and found that the index log 
(T - S)/(R- P) had the highest correlation (r • .64) with the number 
of competitive responses. Steele and Tedeschi described more accurately 
the relationship between the index and the proportion of cooperative 
responses. As the value of the ratio (R - P)/(T - S) increases, the 
rate of cooperation also increases. Jones, Steele, Gahagan, and Tedeschi 
(1968) suggested that if a treatment condition is hypothesized to raise 
the cooperative proportion, The Prisoner Dilemma Game will be more 
sensitive to this when the value of the ratio is low and when sucker and 
punishment have negative payoff values. The value of the ratio is an 
important determinant of cooperative behavior and needs to be set at a 
value such that changes in behavior can occur and can be measured. 
In both studies which used the zap option as a measure of 
aggression, subjects redeemed the play money which they won for real 
money or M & Ms. There are conflicting results in the literature 
regarding the effect of money payoffs on the percentage of cooperative 
responses. Gumpert, Deutsch, and Epstein (1969) found no change in 
competitive responses when players were playing for real or imaginary 
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money. Oskamp and Kleinke (1970) found some evidence that real money 
payoffs actually decreased the percentage of cooperative behavior. On 
the other hand, Solomon and Kaufman (1972) found that real money in-
creased cooperative behavior. Thus~ the effect of real money payoffs 
is unclear. Regardless of the effect, real money is necessary for the 
zap option to be considered a measure of angry aggression. If money 
is not used, one of the main motives of subjects would be to beat the 
other player, and it would be a good game strategy to use the zap option. 
, 
In this case the zap option might be a measure of instrumental aggres-
sion. By using money and by emphasing in the instructions that the 
purpose of the game is to see how many points you can accumulate and 
how much money you can win, regardless of the other player's total, the 
use of the zap option is harm-intending and a measure of angry 
aggression rather than instrumental aggression. 
Effect of Reasonableness of Provocation on Aggression 
In the research on provocation, very little information was given 
to the subject about the confederate's action which might c~nge or alter 
the subject's judgments. Other studies have found that the judgments 
by the subject regarding attack are affected by his value system 
(Blumenthal, Kahn, & Andrews, 1971), the characteristics of the provoker 
(Albert, 1973; Schlenker & Tedeschi, 1972), and the behavior of others 
with whom the subject has contact (Schachter & Singer, 1962). Recent 
findings in attribution research have focused on those variables that 
affect people's judgments and these results have been applied to the 
study of aggression. Researchers have manipulated the cognitions which 
the subject has about his level of arousal (Berkowitz, Lepinski, & 
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Angulo, 1969), the source of his arousal (Geen, Rakosky, & Pigg, 1972; 
Geen & Pigg, 1973), and the behavioral options which the subject has 
available (Geen & Pigg, 1973). But there has been limited work done on 
whether attributions about the reasons or causes of the provoker's 
actions will affect the subject's labeling of the provocation as attack 
and his arousal as anger. 1 Reasons or causes of the provoker's be-
havior pertain primarily to judgments about the third condition, 
illegitimacy, and possibly the second condition, intent to harm. 
In the '50s and '60s, there was a group of studies which varied 
the arbitrariness, reasonableness, or justifiableness of situations 
and found that if a provocation occurred because of justifiable reasons, 
then the subject aggressed less. In the ~irst experiment in this line 
of research, Pastore (1952) presented some subjects with 10 nonjustifiable 
events and other subjects with similar situations in which the provoker 
had _some justification for his acts. An example of the former is "Your 
date phones at the last minute and breaks the appointment without an 
adequate explanation." In the justified condition, the statement was 
changed to "Your date phones at the last minute and breaks the 
appointment because she had suddenly become ill." The justified 
statements elicited considerably fewer self-report aggressive responses. 
lin the studies on the effect of provocation on aggression, it 
seems very likely that the subjects labeled the provocation as 
attack and, as a result, were angry and aggressed. In the 
remainder of this paper, the labeling of_provocation as attack and 
arousal as anger will be viewed as similar processes which occur 
at the same time. 
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Cohen (1955) and Rothaus and Worchel (1960) also used statements about 
hypothetical situations and found that reasonable explanations reduced 
aggression. 
Kregarman and Worchel (1961) experimentally manipulated two 
aspects of arbitrariness, reasonableness of a person's action and the 
unexpectedness of a person's action. Differences in reasonableness 
did not result in differences in verbal aggression (self-report), 
but unexpected events did lead to greater aggression. However, the 
r 
authors stated that the instructions might not have been effective in 
inducing two sufficiently extreme degrees of reasonableness. Fishman 
(1965) experimentally varied the degree of justification. Subjects 
were promised $2 if they succeeded at a task. Some subjects didn't 
succeed and were deprived of the $2 (justified). Other subjects 
succeeded, but the experimenter refused to.give them their money (non-
justified). Subjects in the nonjustified condition expressed more 
aggression. These studies suggest that a reasonable explanation about · 
a provocation will result in less aggression than a nonjustified or 
ambiguous explanation about a provocation (this line of reason will later 
be used to support hypothesis 3). 
Interaction of Reasonableness and Provocation 
The section on attack indicated that increased provocation 
resulted in increased aggression. The section on justification suggested 
that when a provocation is reasonable, people do not aggress as much 
as when the provocation is unreasonable, arbitrary, or ambiguous. Do 
these two factors interact ·or will the effect of one override the effect 
of the other? Research has not focused on this question directly; 
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however, some related research will be examined. Several studies have 
found that theories which explain behavior at low levels of provocation 
are not relevant at high levels. For example, Baron (1973) found that 
threatened retaliation reduced subsequent aggression when the subject 
was not previously anger~d, but did not reduce aggression if the subject 
was highly angered by the person who had threatened him. Baron (1974) 
stated that pain cues decreased aggression if the subject had not been 
previously angered; but when the subject was angered, pain cues possibly 
facilitated aggression. This literature provides the basis for 
hypothesis 5 which is that a reasonable explanation of a provocation will 
not reduce aggression as much with high provocation as with low provo-
cation. More specifically, the difference in aggression between high 
and low provocation for a reasonable explanation about a provocation will 
be greater than the difference between high and low provocation for a 
nonjustified or ambiguous explanation about a provoker. 
Effect of Unreasonableness of Provocation on Aggression 
Previous studies have not investigated the effect of an un-
reasonable ~lanation of a provocation on aggression. Since the 
literature provided no indications of possible hypotheses relating 
unreasonable explanation to aggression, a pilot study was done to 
investigate the effect of an unreasonable attribution. Subjects were 
given a written description of the procedure involving the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game and the zap option (see Appendix E). They were asked to 
imagine that they were participating in a psychology experiment with a 
hypothetical person named "Sam." They were told that Sam used the zap 
option on them six out of a possible ten times that he could have used 
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the option. It was also explained that before the experiment began, 
they overheard Sam commenting to the experimenter about his personal 
life. Ten different comments which Sam supposedly made to the 
experimenter, were presented. Five of the comments were designed to 
make Sam's behavior appear reasonable; five were designed to make 
Sam's behavior appear unreasonable; and an additional condition was 
included in which Sam didn't say anything to the experimenter. It 
should be noted that these studies were not direct explanations of the 
r 
provocation, that is, Sam's behavior. Instead, the subjects had to 
make an attribution that the situations mentioned in the comments 
affected his behavior in the game. One of the purposes of the pilot 
was to determine whether the subjects believed that the stories made 
Sam's behavior in the game more or less reasonable. 
Subjects were asked to do three things: to rate how reasonable 
or unreasonable was Sam's behavior based on each piece of information; 
to rank order the eleven situations placing first the situation which 
made Sam's behavior the most reasonable; and to indicate if they would 
feel hostile or concerned and if they would use the zap option (see 
Appendix E) • 
The information was pooled and the story that made Sam's 
behavior appear the most reasonable was chosen and called the reason-
able attribution. The word "attribution" was used because the story 
did not directly explain Sam's behavior. Similarly, the comment that 
made Sam's behavior appear the most unreasonable was chosen and called 
the unreasonable attribution. Also, the most unreasonable story was 
compared to the no information or ambiguous situation. The results 
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indicated that there were no clear differences between these two 
situations on any of the measures. Thus, null hypothesis 2 suggests 
that there will be no significant difference in aggression between an 
unreasonable ·attribution about a provoker and no information about a 
provoker. It was also anticipated that there would not be an inter-
action effect between the effect of the attribution and the level of 
provocation. Specifically, it was anticipated that the difference in 
aggression between high and low provocation for an unreasonable 
attribution about a provoker will not be significantly greater than 
the difference in aggression between high and low provocation for no 
information about the provoker (null hypothesis 4). 
Comparison of Two Theories of Aggression 
Many of the studies discussed above have been interpreted as 
supporting two divergent theories of aggression: inhibition theory and 
differential cognitive appraisal. According to inhibition theory, low 
aggressors are angry and have labeled the provocation as attack but do 
not exhibit overt aggression because they inhibit the response. A 
differential cognitive appraisal theory predicts that low aggressors 
are not angry and have not labeled the provocation as attack. This 
point of confusion may be clarified by comparing the anger ratings of 
high aggressors and low aggressors. Inhibition theory predicts that 
there will be no difference in anger between the two groups and 
differential cognitive appraisal does predict a difference. 
Inhibition theory maintains that when a person is inhibiting 
aggression, his original instigation to attack (anger) is present, but 
he refrains from aggressing. Dollard et al. (1939) maintained that 
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fear of punishment is the inhibitor. "The strength of inhibition of 
any act of aggression varies positively with the amount of punishment 
anticipated to be a consequence of that act" (p. 37). Berkowitz (1962) 
agreed that fear of punishment was an inhibitor, and he also added that 
a person will inhibit an aggressive act if he believes his hostile act 
will violate the standards of conduct whi~h he wants to uphold. Staub 
(1971) elaborated on Berkowitz's second inhibitor and stated that a 
person feels anxiety or guilt when he anticipates violating a standard 
, 
of conduct. Staub also recognized one other, neglected inhibitor of 
aggression, empathy. Most writers have defined empathy as the ability 
to know how another person feels and to have, to some degree, those same 
feelings within oneself. None of the authors cited have discussed how 
inhibition works. Each of the examples of inhibition seem to involve an 
unpleasant emotion, such as fear, anxiety, guilt, pain, sorrow, etc. A 
person anticipates that he will feel one of these emotions if and when he 
aggresses. If the anticipated experience is sufficiently uncomfortable, 
inhibition theory predicts that the person will usually inhibit an 
aggressive response. In summary, inhibition theory states that low 
aggressors will be ready to counteraggress but will not aggress because 
they believe it is not appropriate or it is immoral to aggress. They 
most likely anticipate the anxiety and guilt that they would feel if 
they aggressed and this anticipation prevents them from aggressing. 
Other theorists (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1968; Schachter, 1964) 
have emphasized that people make a cognitive appraisal of the situation 
which then determines their emotions and their actions. Geen (1968) 
found that subjects label their arousal as anger and are more aggressive 
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if an aggressive cue, e.g., a gun, is present. Schachter and Singer 
(1962) specifically found that people use information given by another 
person to form their labels for their emotional states. All three of 
these cognitive theorists maintain that a person cognitively evaluates 
the information at hand to determine his emotion and/or action tendency. 
These theorists suggest that low aggressors show less aggression be-
cause they have not labeled their arousal as anger (Schachter, 1964), 
or have not evaluated the situation as threatening (Lazarus, 1968), or 
, 
have not decided that attack is the appropriate response tendency 
(Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1968). On all three cases, differential 
cognitive appraisal predicts that low aggressors not only exhibit less 
aggression but also feel less angry than high aggressors. 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
This experiment was designed to determine whether provocation 
and attributions about provocations result in differences in subject 
aggression and in self-reported anger. In addition, the interaction 
of provocation and attributions can be examined. Provocation was 
manipulated by varying the number of times (one or six) that the con-
federate will use the zap option of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in 
the first 10 opportunities. The zap option takes money away from the 
oppos.ing player at a cost to the player using the option. The zap 
option has been considered to be a response which can be "unambiguously 
interpreted as harm-intending aggression" (Berger & Tedeschi, 1969). 
The subjects overheard three different conversations between the con-
federate and the experimenter about the causes of the confederate's 
behavior. Thus a 2 x 3 randomized group design with two levels of 
provocation and three different attribution conditions was employed. 
Aggression was measured by the number of times that the subject uses 
the zap option. Anger was measured by means of a self-rating. 
This experiment extended the work of previous studies in three 
ways. First, this study investigated directly the effect of 
attributions about provocations at different levels of provocation. 
·Secondly, anger ratings were used to compare the.predictions from 
inhibition theory and differential cognitive appraisal. Thirdly, it 
was determined whether subjects label the confederate's provocation in 
this experiment as an attack, as subjects did the confederate's 
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provocation using the Buss Machine as the vehicle for the provocation. 
r 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
This completes the review of the literature pertaining to the 
hypotheses tested in this experiment. The hypotheses will now be 
summarized. First, a minor terminology change will be made in the 
wording of the hypotheses as they appeared in the review of the 
literature. As the discussion of the pilot experiment indicated, a 
direct reasonable or unreasonable explanation about a provocation was 
not given. Instead oubjects had to infer that the recent events in the 
confederate's life caused his behavior during the game. So, in the 
description of the various conditions, the word "attribution" was 
substituted for the word "explanation." Secondly, since it was pre-
dicted from the pilot study that there would be no difference in 
aggression between the unreasonable attribution groups and the ambiguous 
attribution groups, the reasonable attribution groups were compared to 
the combined unreasonable and ambiguous groups instead of just the 
ambiguous groups, as was indicated in the review.of the literature. 
This permits the five hypotheses to be evaluated by five orthogonal 
comparisons· (Winer, 1971). 
It was expected that: 
1. High provocation would result in more aggression than lo~ 
provocation (the first main effect hypothesis). (See Figure 3 for a 
graphical presentation of the expected results if all five hypotheses 
would be validated.) 
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Figure 3. The Expected Mean Number of Zaps for Three 
Attribution Conditions at Two Levels of 
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30 
between an unreasonable attribution about a provoker and no information 
about a provoker (a second main effect hypothesis, also a no effect or 
null hypothesis). 
3. A reasonable attribution about a provoker would lead to less 
aggression than either an unreasonable attribution about a provoker or 
no information about a provoker (a third main effect hypothesis). 
4. The difference in aggression between high and low provocation 
for an unreasonable attribution about a provoker would not be signifi-
, 
cantly greater than the difference in aggression between high and low 
provocation for no information about a provoker (the first interaction 
hypothesis, a no effect or null hypothesis). 
5. The difference in aggression between high and low provocation 
for a reasonable attribution about a provoker would be greater than the 
difference between high and low provocatiOn for either an unreasonable 
attributiQn about a provoker or no information about a provoker (a 
second interaction hypothesis). 
This study also examined the difference in anger ratings in 
order to compare inhibition theory and differential cognitive appraisal. 
· Inhibition theory predicts that there would be no difference in anger 
ratings between high aggressors and low aggressors. Differential 
cognitive appraisal predicts, on the other hand, that anger rating 
would be greater for high aggressors than for low aggressors. 
METHOD 
Subjects and Confederate 
Ninety, white male students enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses at Indiana University, Purdue University Indianapolis partici-
pated in the experiment. Fifteen subjects were randomly assigned to 
each cell. Although participating in psychology experiments is not 
a course requirement, students were given extra credit for partici-
pating. Subjects also earned a maximum of $3.00 and a minimum of 
$2.00 in this experiment. The confederate was a chubby, 22 year old 
white, male, college senior who had a beard and mustache. 
Design 
A 2 x ·3 factorial design was used based upon two levels of 
attack (high and low), and three attribution conditions (reasonable, 
unreasonable, and ambiguous). Fifteen subjects were randomly assigned 
to each cell of the design. 
Apparatus 
In the room were chairs, a table, and a screen separating the 
confederate's side from the subject's side. In the middle of the 
screen were the rules for the game (see Appendix A). On each side of 
the table was a stack of play money and two poker chips. The 
experimenter sat on one end of the table where there was a pencil and 
a manilla folder. 
Procedure 
After the subject arrived, the subject and confederate were 
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taken to the experimental room where the experimenter obtained the 
subject's and confederate's name. 
Then the experimenter said, "I am studying the effects of 
different game strategies and game techniques on how much money people . 
win and how people behave and feel in various types of situations. 
You will have to make some decisions during this game which will deter-
mine how much money you win and I will also ask you to fill out a 
questionnaire about how you feel. I want you to fill out this question-
r 
naire both before and after the game. 
"The object of this game is to win as much play money and real 
money as you can. You each have $200 of play money to begin with. If 
you end up with $220, you will receive 20¢ of real money. That is, for 
every play dollar you win, I will give you a penny after the game. Here 
is how the game is played. You both have identical red and white chips. 
There will be 50 turns to this game, and on each turn all you have to 
do is push the red or white chip towards me when I say, 'Go."' (These 
instructions are very similar to those of Anchor and Cross, 1974.) 
"Now let's see how money is won and lost. On the board in front 
of each of you are four rules" (see Appendix A). If both of you push 
red chips, you each receive $12. If you (subject) push the red one and 
you (confederate) push the white one, you (subject) will lose $4 and 
you (confederate) will win $15. If you (subject) push the white one 
and you (confederate) push the red one, you (subject) will receive $15 
and you (confederate) will lose $4. If you both push white chips, 
both of you will lose $3. Now that's all there is to the game. Any 
questions so far? (The experimenter then paused to allow for any 
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questions.) Remember your job is to win as much money as you can. You 
are not in competition with each other. Both of you have a stack of 
money on your table and you are to take that money from the stack or 
put it back on the stack when I tell you the results of each turn. 
There is also one other aspect of this game. After each five 
moves, I will say the word 'Option.' At this time you may raise your 
hand which is closest to me or don't raise your hand. If you raise 
your hand, this means that you want to give up $4 of your money to the 
r 
bank and make the other player pay $20 of his money to the bank. If 
neither of you raise your hand within fifteen seconds, we'll just 
continue playing as before. If both of you raise your hand, then the 
option will be in effect for both of you, that is you each will give up 
$4 plus $20 or a total of $24. I will say the word option after the 
5th move, lOth move, 15th move, and so on. The last option will come 
after the 50th and final move. 
"Here's bow we'll play. I'll say the number of the move, for 
example, 'Number 1, Go.' When I say 'Go,' be sure to push either your 
white or red chip. Then after the 5th move, lOth move, and so on, I'll 
say the word 'Option.' Then you may raise your band if you want to. 
Fifteen seconds after I say the word 'Option,' I'll tell you. if neither, 
both or one of you raised your hand. After each trial and after each 
option, make the appropriate transaction with the bank. /~~~~!\~er{~"·, · ·, 
questions? 
1
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"Either of you may withdraw from this study at ~ny t:fllj.~labd''yo~' 
will be given money for coming to the experiment. I~y~~/ 
continue, I would like you to sign this document of informed consent 
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(see Appendix B) which is part of the standard procedure for people 
participating in some psychological experiments. 
"Now before we begin, I would like you to fill out this 
questionnaire or checklist." The Multiple Affect Adjective Check List 
(Zuckerman, 1960; Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel, & Valerius, 1964) (see 
Appendix C) was administered. 
The experimenter then asked if there were any questions. The 
subject overheard the following conversation between the experimenter 
, 
and confederate if the subject was in the reasonable attribution 
condition. 
Experimenter (!): Do you have any questions? 
Confederate (C): Well, sort of ••• after answering that questionnaire 
I realize I've got something on my mind and I hope it doesn't 
mess things up ••• 
E: What is it? 
C: Well, I'm pretty uptight. 
E: Go ahead. 
~: A couple of days ago my wife was sick and I took her to 
Community Hospital. They gave her some medicine, but they 
wanted to keep her for a day for observations and tests. That 
was two and a half days ago. I'm really worried that there is 
something wrong. I've asked the doctors what's wrong and they 
haven't given me or my wife an answer. 
E: I can see you are worried ••• ! don't know what to say. You 
caught me off guard •••• ! guess the only thing that is important 
is that you can concentrate on the game. Do you think that you 
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can concentrate on the game? 
C: Yes, I believe so. 
E: Do you have any other questions? 
£.: No. 
E: Do you (subject) have any questions? 
Subjects in the unreasonable condition heard the following 
conversation. 
E: Do you have any questions? 
• C: Well; sort of ••• after answering that questionnaire I realize 
I've got something on my mind and I hope it doesn't mess things 
up. • • 
E: What is it? 
C: Well, ·r•m very angry. 
E: Go ahead. 
C: My steady girlfriend just called me and broke tonight's date 
because she had the flu. I know she had a sore throat, but even 
if she was sick, she still could have gone out with me. 
E: I can see you are angry ••• ! don't know what to say. You caught 
me off guard •••• ! guess the only thing that is important is that 
you can concentrate on the game. Do you think that you can 
concentrate on the game? 
C: Yes, I believe so. 
·E: Do you have any other questions? 
C: No. 
E: Do you (subject) have any questions? 
Subjects in the ambiguous condition heard the following 
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innocuous conversation. 
E: Do you have any questions? 
C: No. 
~: po you (subject) have any questions? 
The experimenter then reminded them, "Remember, there is no 
winner or loser in this game. Don't feel_ that you must defeat anyone 
else. Your payoff does not depend on how much the other guy makes." 
The confederate used the zap option one (low provocation) or 
• 
six {high provocation) times out of the ten opportunities. In the low 
provocation condition, the confederate used the option on the fourth 
opportunity. In the high provocation condition, the confederate used 
the option on the first, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, and ninth 
opportunities. 
The confederate played a 50% cooperative and 50% competitive 
random schedule of responses. After the game was completed, subjects 
were again asked to complete the MUltiple Affect Adjective Check List 
and several questions about the confederate's feelings to determine if 
the subject was aware of the independent variable (see Appendix D). 
The experimenter then debriefed the subjects, and any money which was 
taken away because of the confederate's or subject's use of the option 
was returned. 
RESULTS 
The two principal independent variables in this study were level 
or provocation by a confederate and attributions about the reasonable-
ness of the confederate's behavior. Provocation was operationally 
defined by the frequency of the use of the zap option in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game by the confederate. Two, fixed levels of provocation 
were used. Low provocation was defined as the confederate's use of the 
r 
zap option once during the ten opportunities to use the option. High 
provocation was defined as the confederate using the option six times 
during the ten opportunities. The other independent variable was 
attribution. There were three types of attributions. In the ambiguous 
attribution condition, no information was given to the subject about 
recent events in the confederate's life. The subject was free to assign 
whatever motives he chose to the subject's actions. In the reasonable 
attribution condition, subjects overheard the confederate telling the 
experimenter that he was very worried because his wife had recently and 
unexpectedly been taken to the hospital for observation and tests. In 
the unreasonable attribution condition, subjects overheard the confed-
erate telling the experimenter that he was very angry because the 
confederate's girlfriend had called today and broke tonight's date 
because she was sick. 
The major dependent variables were aggression and anger ratings. 
Aggression was defined as the number of times that the subject used the 
zap option. Anger was defined by the subject's score on the Multiple 
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Affect Adjective Checklist (Zuckerman, 1960; Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel, 
& Valerius, 1964) after the game was completed. The questionnaire was 
also administered before the game to determine if any of the groups 
significantly differed in anger level before the experiment began. 
Effect of Provocation on Aggression 
The data analysis is presented in four sections. The first 
section deals with the effect of provocation on aggression. The first 
' hypothesis stated that subjects would aggress more if they were in the 
, 
high provocation condition than if they were in the low provocation 
condition. The mean number of "zaps" and the mean pretest and posttest 
anger ratings for each of the six conditions are presented in Tables 1 
and 2, respectively. Under high provocation, subjects used a mean of 
4.16 "zaps" as compared with a mean of 2.56 "zaps" under low provo-
cation. This difference was statistically significant, F (1,84) = 
10.01, ~ < .-. 005. .. Subjects who were highly provoked did aggress more 
against the confederate th&n subjects who were only slightly provoked 
(hypothesis 1). 
Effect of Attributions on Aggression 
Checks on manipulation of attributions. After the formal part 
of the experiment was completed, the subjects were individually asked 
to .rate on a 14 point scale how angry, worried, and happy the other 
player felt (see Appendix D).· The purpose of this was to assess whether 
the subjects heard and remembered the emotional feelings described by 
the confederate in the two attribution conditions. Subjects in the 
reasonable (worried confederate) condition gave the confederate a mean 
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of 6.03 for the confederate by the subjects in the no emotion or 
ambiguous condition. This difference was statistically significant, 
t (56) • 4.10, ~ < .0005. This indicates that there is a difference in 
the degree of worry attributed to the confederate in the two different 
conditions. In addition, when the subjects were debriefed, 29 out of 
30 subJect-~. who were''ln the reasonable attribution condition remembered 
that the confederate's wife was in the hospital. These results provide 
evidence that the subject had heard and remembered the experimental 
r 
manipulation. 
Subjects in the unreasonable and angry attribution condition 
gave the confederate a mean anger rating of 9.93 (very angry) while 
subjects in the ambiguous condition gave him a 5.43 mean anger rating. 
This statistically significant difference, ~ (56) = 4.55, ~ < .005, 
indicates that s~b.fe~ts in the two groups -differed in the anger feelings 
which they at~~J!I,bu~ed to the confederate. Also, during the debriefing 
27 out of 30 subjects in the unreasonable conditions recalled that the 
confederate was angry because his girlfriend cancelled the date, and 25 
out of 30 knew that shebroke the date because she was sick. Thus, 
. ~.· ... 
., . 
... " 
again there was evidence that most subjects heard the experimental 
· · . ··-unipulation and could recall it. 
From t~e above analysis, subjects knew how the confederate felt 
. ~ ..... ' -~ ': '.". . · .. ·' '. 
·and most subjects remembered why he felt angry or worried. In this 
study it was expected that subjects would attribute the confederate's 
emotion and this incident about his wife or girlfriend as causes of the 
confederate's provocation during the experiment. To determine whether 
subjects made this attribution, the subjects were individually asked 
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whether the confederate's mood influenced the way he played the game. 
This questionnaire was given after the formal part of the experiment 
was completed (see Appendix D). Forty-four out of 56 subjects in the 
reasonable and unreasonable groups indicated that his mood did in-
fluence how he played. A chi square analysis indicated that this 
difference was significant, x2 (1) = 18.29, ~ < .001. This provides 
some support for believing that subjects attributed the confederate's 
mood as a cause of his behavior during the game. Subjects were also 
, 
asked how did the confederate's mood influence his behavior during the 
game. Fifty percent of the subjects indicated that the incident with 
his girlfriend or wife influenced how he felt. These two pieces of data 
provide some reason to believe that most subjects made the attribution 
that the incidents influenced how the confederate felt which in turn 
affected how he played the game. 
Data analysis. Since the subjects heard and remembered the 
reasonable and unreasonable attributions, this section will evaluate 
the effect of attributions on aggression. Hypotheses 2 and 4 (null 
hypotheses) were based on the pilot study in which the most unreasonable 
attribution was chosen from the five unreasonable stories and compared 
to the no information or ambiguous situation. These results of the 
pilot suggested that an unreasonable attribution would not alter 
_aggression. 
Both hypotheses 2 and 4, as they are stated, predict that there 
would be no difference in aggression. Usually, an hypothesis predicts 
a difference between groups. The experimenter, therefore, states a 
null hypothesis with the hope of rejecting this hypothesis. Hypotheses 
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2 and 4 predict that the null hypothesis will not be rejected and the 
probability level will be set at .10 instead of .OS. Null hypothesis 2 
states that there will be no significant difference in the number of 
zaps between the unreasonable attribution groups and the ambiguous 
groups. The results can be seen in Table 1. A non-significant main 
effect for attribution provided some support for this null hypothesis. 
The B2 term in Table 3 was not significant, F (1, 84) = 1.16, ~ = .28. 
An unreasonable attribution did not seem to affect aggression • 
• 
It was also predicted that a reasonable attribution about a 
provoker would reduce aggression. The reasonable attribution groups 
were compared with the combined unreasonable and ambiguous groups. 
This was done because it was expected a priori that there would be no 
difference in aggression between these latter two groups. The results 
of the data analysis for hypothesis 2 are consistent with this 
expectation. Hypothesis 3 therefore states that in the combined 
unreasonable and ambiguous groups the number of zaps would be greater 
than in the reasonable attribution group. A significant main effect of 
attribution was expected. The results are shown in Table 4. The 
orthogonal (Winer, 1971) main effect term in Table 3, B1 , evaluated 
this hypothesis •. This term was not significant, F (1,84) • .25, ~' 
and the data did not support the hypothesis. In summary, neither rea-
sonable nor unreasonable attribution affected aggression. 
Interactive Effect of Attribution and Provocation on Aggression 
As was indicated above, the first hypothesis was supporte4 and 
showed that the level of provocation influenced aggression. Also, the 
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aggression. The present section will examine the interactive effect 
of attributions and level of provocation on aggression. The results of 
the pilot suggested that an unreasonable attribution about a provoker 
would not result in differences in aggression between high and low 
provocation. Null hypothesis 4 was tested by comparing the difference 
in the number of zaps between high and low provocation for the un-
reasonable attribution groups with the difference in the number of 
zaps between high and low provocation for the ambiguous groups. As 
• 
can be seen in Figure 4 and Table 1, there was only a small non-
significant difference between high and low provocation in these two 
attribution conditions. It was expected that the attribution by provo-
cation interaction term, Ax B2, would not be significant. An 
examination of Table 3 indicates that the interaction was not significant, 
! (1,84) • .57, ~ • .54. This provides some support for null hypothesis 
4. Thus, unreasonable and ambiguous attributions did not differentially 
influence the effect of the level of provocation on aggression. 
Next the influence of a reasonable attribution and level of 
provocation on aggression was examined. It was expected that the effect 
of high and low provocation on aggression would be influenced by the 
reasonable attribution. It was specifically predicted that there would 
be a larger difference in aggression between high and low provocation 
for the reasonable attribution conditions than between high and low 
provocation for the combined unreasonable and ambiguous conditions. 
The results are contained in Figure 5 and Table 4. As can be seen from 
the graph, the means for high and low provocation in the combined 
ambiguous and unreasonable conditions differ by less than one zap. While 
! 
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Figure 5. Mean Number of "Zaps" in the Reasonable and 
Combined Unreasonable and Ambiguous Conditions 
at Two Levels of Provocation 
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the means for high and low provocation in the reasonable conditions 
differ by more than three zaps. The orthogonal contrast (Winer, 1971) 
used to test this hypothesis is the interaction term A x B contained 
1 
in Table 3. The provocation by attribution term was significant F (1, 
84) • 4.20, ~ < .05. This analysis provides support for the hypothesis 
that the effect of level of provocation on subsequent aggression is 
influenced by reasonable attributions. 
The influence of a reasonable attribution on the effect of 
• 
provocation can be even more clearly seen by using a post hoc analysis 
on the difference in aggression between levels of provocation for the 
combined ambiguous and unreasonable groups and for the reasonable 
groups. Using the Tukey (b) test, there was no significant difference 
in aggression between high and low provocation for the combined 
ambiguous and unreasonable groups, but the difference in aggression 
between high and low provocation for the reasonable attribution was 
significant, !. (56) • 4.42, .E. < .01. There was a significant difference 
in aggression between levels of provocation when a reasonable 
attribution was made about a provoker, but there was not a significant 
difference in aggression between high and low provocation when no 
attribution was made about the provoker or when an unreasonable 
attribution was made. In summary, provocation influenced aggression and 
a reasonable attribution enhanced the effect of provocation on aggression. 
AnSer Ratings 
Check on manipulation. It was expected that the experimental· 
manipulations would result in an increase in anger and, therefore, any 
aggression could be labeled angry aggression. An increase in anger 
so 
ratings from pretest to postest would provide support for the effect 
of the experimental manipulation. The Multiple Affect Adjective 
Checklist (see Appendix C) was administered before and after the formal 
experiment. The mean pretest anger score was 6. 38 and the mean post-
test anger score was 7.60. This difference was significant, F (1,84) 
• 15.87, ~ < .0005, indicating that anger increased during the 
experiment and that the manipulation was successful in inducing anger. 
Comparison of inhibition theory and differential cognitive 
, 
appraisal. The predictions of differential cognitive appraisal and 
inhibition theory were tested by comparing the anger ratings of high 
aggressors and low aggressors. The subjects were ranked in terms of 
the number of "zaps" used. The low aggre~sion group was defined as 
those subjects who used the zap option once or not at all. There were 
29 subjects in this group. This was the bottom 32% of the distribution. 
The.high aggression group was defined as those subjects who used the 
zap option from five to 10 times. There were 24 subjects in this 
group. This was the upper 27% of the distribution. Inhibition 
theory predicts that there will be no difference in anger ratings 
between these two groups. Differential cognitive appraisal predicts 
that the high aggressors will have higher anger ratings. Before this 
hypothesis was tested, it was necessary to examine the differences in 
anger scores before any experimental manipulations took place (pretest 
scores). The mean pretest anger ratings are presented in TableS. As 
can be seen, the low aggressors had a higher mean anger score than the 
high aggressors. This difference was evaluated by the Newman-Kuels 
test and the difference between the groups was not significant, ~ (52) = 
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Table 5 
Mean Pretest and Posttest Anger Ratings for 
Aggressor 
Groups 
Low (N • 29) 
High (N • 24) 
, 








1.05. Thus, before the experimental manipulations took place the 
high and low aggressors did not reliably differ in terms of their 
level of anger. 
Since the pretest scores did not differ significantly, the 
posttest anger scores were next examined to compare the predictions of 
the two theories. The low aggression group again had a higher mean 
reported anger score than the high aggression group which is counter 
to the predictions of differential cognitive appraisal (see Table 5). 
However, when the difference between the two groups on their posttest 
scores was evaluated by the Newman-Kuels test, it was not significant, 
~ (52) • 1.36. Differences in aggression were not related to differences 
in anger levels. Thus, hypotheses one, t~o, four, and five were 
supported. Only hypothesis three was not supported. 
DISCUSSION 
Aggression Defined by the Zap Option 
Several authors (Anchor & Cross, 1974; Berger & Tedeschi, 1969) 
have stated that the zap option is a measure of aggression. However, 
only two studies have used the zap option. Most of the studies in the 
literature have used shock in connection with the Buss Machine as a 
measure of aggression. In this type of experiment provocation was 
defined as the use of shock by the confederate on the subject and 
aggression was defined as the use of shock by the subject on the con-
federate. In the present experiment provocation was defined as the use 
of the zap option by the confederate on the subject and aggression was 
defined as the use of the zap option by the subject on the confederate. 
The present experiment confirmed the finding of previous experiments 
(Epstein & Taylor, 1967; Knott & Drost, 1972; Taylor, 1967) that high 
provocation resulted in more aggression than low provocation. Thus the 
subjects in the present experiment responded behaviorally to provocation· 
as they had in previous experiments. These experiments have used a 
between subjects design to compare subjects' anger ratings in the 
provocation condition with different subjects' anger ratings in the no 
provocation condition. Subjects in the provocation condition were found 
·to be more angry. In the present experiment a within subjects design 
was used to evaluate the effect of provocation on subjects' anger 
ratings. The increase in anger ratings from·pretest to posttest in-
dicated that subjects became more angry and labeled the provocation 
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as an attack. Thus, in terms of both behavior and cognitive labeling 
(anger), subjects responded similarly to provocation as defined by the 
use of the zap option as they did to the use of shock by the confederate. 
These findings add support for the_zap option as a measure of aggression 
and suggest that this strategy in connection with the Prisoner's Dilemma 
game has the additional advantage of providing an alternative to electric 
shock as an operational definition for both provocation ("zaps" by con-
federate) and aggression ("zaps" by subject). This alternative to shock 
is needed at this time since there has been much criticism about the use 
of shock in psychology experiments. 
Reasonable Attribution Determines the Effect of Provocation on Aggression 
The results also indicate that the difference in aggression 
between high ·and low provocation for a reasonable attribution about a 
provoker was greater than the difference,between high and low provocation 
for both an unreasonable attribution about a provoker and no inf~rmation 
about a provoker. These different levels of. provocation seemed to have 
little effect on aggression when they were used in connection with un-
reasonable or ambiguous attributions but seem to have dramatically 
different effects when used with a reasonable attribution. A reasonable 
attribution under low provocation seemed to decrease aggression 
(although not significant) but seemed to increase aggression under high 
provocation (although not significant). This finding seems to be in 
agreement with recent studies in similar areas where interactional 
effects have been found between provocation and attributed subject 
variables. Baron (1974) found that pain cues from the victim of 
aggression tend to reduce aggression when the person was not previously 
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aroused or when the person was moderately aroused (Baron, 1971); but 
facilitated aggression when the aggressor was highly provoked by the 
victim. Baron (1973) also found a similar differential effect of 
threatened retaliation. Threateded retaliation from the confederate 
reduced aggression when the aggressor was not provoked, but did not 
reduce aggression when the aggressor was highly provoked. These studies 
point up the complexity of the area and the need to consider not only 
the level of prior provocation, although level of provocation is a 
, 
powerful variable in and of itself, but also pain cues from the victim, 
possibility of retaliation, and additional information about the 
provoker. 
Reasonable Attribution Reduced Aggression for questionnaire Studies 
but Not for Experimental Studies 
Attribution, when considered by itself, did not seem to have any 
effect on aggression. This is in contrast to prior studies which have 
found main effects for attribution. MOst of the previous studies in 
this area have been questionnaire studies in which subjects were given 
hypothetical situations and asked to imagine what they would do or how 
they would feel. In the present experiment, subjects were placed in a 
situation.which was set up to be more life-like and, hopefully, the 
subjects were more involved. As a result, they are likely to have a 
different reaction to the attributions. For example, they are likely 
to be more aroused in the present experimental study because money was 
actually taken away from them. Also, seeing and meeting a person may 
affect the subject's willingness to take money away from him (Milgram, 
1965). In the pilot study which also involved a questionnaire pro-
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cedure, subjects were asked to imagine that they were highly provoked 
by the confederate. They were then told to indicate how many times 
they would use the zap option. The results of the pilot,study are in 
accord with the previous questionnaire studies, subjects said they 
would aggress less when they heard the reasonable story. In further 
support for this point, the only other experimental study (Kregarman 
& Worchel, 1961) which used an experimental procedure did not find 
differences in aggression as a function of differences in reasonable-
r 
ness. As the reader has seen, however, the students in the high 
provocation behaved in just the reverse of what was expected. 
Two aspects of the more life-like, experimental situation may 
account for the difference in results between the questionnaire and 
experimental studies. First, in the.questionnaire study, subjects were 
asked to imagine that the confederate took.money away from them six 
times; and in the experimental study, the confederate actually took 
money away from them six times. The subjects may have been more highly 
provoked or aroused by the confederate when he actually took money away 
from them than when they just imagined that he did. Thus, in a sense, 
the experimental procedure could be considered a high provocation and 
the questionnaire procedure a low provocation. It has been demonstrated 
in the present study that a reasonable attribution about a provoker 
tends to reduce aggression under low provocation·but tends to increase 
aggression under high provocation. Thus, it is possible that the 
reasonable attribution reduces aggression for the less provoking, 
"imagination" procedure of the questionnaire studies, but. tended to 
increase aggression for the more provoking, life-like, experimental 
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procedure. Differences in perceived level of provocation of the 
questionnaire and experimental procedures may account for differences· 
in aggression for these procedures. 
Secondly, in the present experimental situation the subject muse 
aggress against a person whom he has met and seen; and it has been 
demonstrated that subjects aggress less against persons whom they have 
met and have seen (Zimbardo, 1969). Thus, differences between the two 
procedures in anonymity of the victim of aggression may result in 
, 
differences in aggression between the questionnaire and experimental 
procedure. In summary, differences in the two strategies seem to result 
in different subject responses to a reasonable attribution or 
explanation. 
Inhibition Theory vs. Differential Cognitive Appraisal as Explanations 
of Aggression 
This study also examined differences in anger ratings to determine 
whether differential cognitive appraisal or inhibition theory seem to 
better explain differences in subject aggression. Since the two theories 
apply only to angry aggression, it should be noted that subjects became 
significantly more angry from the beginning to the end of the experiment 
indicating that use of the zap option can be labeled as angry aggression 
and that both theories would be applicable. In order to determine 
whether differential cognitive appraisal or inhibition theory explained 
differences in aggression, anger ratings for subjects who used the zap 
option most during the game (high aggressors) were compared with the 
anger ratings for subjects who used the zap option the least (low 
aggressors). Differential cognitive appraisal predicts that high 
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aggressors would have higher anger ratings than low aggressors. In-
hibition theory predicts that there would be no difference in anger 
scores between the high aggressors and the low aggressors. Thus, in-
hibition theory was supported. Also, there were no significant differ~ 
ences in anger ratings for any of the conditions for which there were 
significant differences in aggression. This would seem to mean that 
subjects utilized information about level of provocation and 
attributions to inhibit aggression • 
• 
In a further test of the two theories, aggression scores for 
individuals who had high posttest anger ratings (high anger) were 
compared with the aggression scores for individuals who had low posttest 
anger (low anger) ratings. There was no significant difference in 
aggression for the two groups, adding further support for inhibition 
theory. While the data suggest that inhibition theory better explains 
subject aggression, there is a possibility that anger ratings taken 
during the experiment would have supported differential cognitive 
appraisal. In the present experiment the anger rating scale was 
administered after the game was over. It is possible that the high 
aggressors experienced some catharsis after aggressing (Hokanson & 
Burgess, 1962) which may have reduced the intensity of anger ratings 
which were taken after the experimental procedure was completed. In a 
future experiment the possibility could be tested by having subjects 
ind~cate their anger during the game as well as before and after the 
game. 
Only one previous study examined anger ratings for subjects 
.who were highly provoked and moderately provoked. In contrast to the 
59 
present study, Knott and Drost (1972) found that people who were highly 
provoked rated themselves as more angry than people who were moderately 
provoked. There are numerous differences between the present study and 
the Knott and Drost study. For example, the Knott and Drost study had 
much less interaction between the subject and the confederate in their 
"game" situation. They also separated the provocation from aggression 
and had two sets of provocations while the present experiment had only 
one. Their procedures increased fear and stress during the experiment 
• 
and the present experiment decreased anxiety. Because of these 
differences and because there have been so few studies in this area, it 
is impossible to sort out the reasons for the differing results. 
Possibilities for Future Experiments 
Another parameter influencing the effect of provocation on 
aggression. The present study demonstrated that the effect of 
provocation on aggression is influenced by attributions about the 
provoker. Methodological differences among aggression studies suggest 
another parameter which may influence the effect of provocation on 
aggression. In the present experiment there were 10 trials and on each 
trial the confederate could "zap" the subject (provocation) and the 
subject could "zap" the confederate (aggression). Other experiments 
using shock have restricted the use of shock. For example, the 
confederate would have 10 opportunities to shock the subject {provo-
cation), followed by 10 additional opportunities for the confederate 
to shock the subject. These two designs differ in the amount of 
interaction between the provoker and the aggressor. Thus, there is 
much more interaction between the confederate and the subject in the 
60 
design used in the present experiment than in previous Buss-type 
experiments. This difference in the degree of interaction between these 
two designs could alter the effect of provocation on aggression. The 
effect of this methodological difference will depend on the subject's 
interpretation of the confederate's behavior in the high interaction 
design. In the high interaction design. the subject may realize that 
when he uses the zap option, the confederate also has a chance to 
retaliate. However, there is no fear of retaliation from the confederate 
in the low interaction design. Studies on threat of retaliation 
(Baron, 1973) suggest that there will be less aggression in the high 
interaction design at low provocation; but there will be no difference 
in aggression between the two designs at high provocation. The subject 
could also make a different interpretation. In the high interaction 
design, the subject may believe that the confederate is using the 
option because the subject used the option. For subjects who make this 
type of attribution, the high interaction design may have the effect of 
reducing aggression for both high and low provocation when compared to 
the low interaction design. The effect of provocation on aggression 
should be investigated for both types of designs. 
Effect of an unreasonable attribution. The reasonable attribution 
was an important parameter in determining the effect of level of provo-
cation on aggression; but the unreasonable attribution did not influence 
the effect of provocation on aggression when compared with the ambiguous 
attribution. However, several factors in the present experiment probably 
reduced the effect of the unreasonable attribution. In the unreasonable 
condition the confederate had to act like he was angry because his girl 
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friend canceled tonight's date because she was sick. The confederate 
for the present study had difficulty presenting himself as angry. This 
may have reduced the unreasonable aspect of the story. In a future 
study more attention should be given to the acting ability of the con-
federate. Also, many of the students seemed to identify with the con-
federate because they believed he was losing his girlfriend. Several 
subjects said that the same thing had happened to them within the last 
week. In support of this possibility, the subjects in the unreasonable 
. . 
condition not only gave the confederate a very high anger rating but also 
a veri high worry rating on the post experimental questionnaire. A 
future experiment should try to eliminate such extraneous features from 
the unreasonable story. 
MOre explicit determination of attribution. The present experi-
ment differed from previous attribution-aggression experiments in two 
ways. In most previous experiments the experimenter actually told the 
subject that his behavior was a result of one or the other of several 
events. For example, in one study (Geen, Rakosky, & Pigg, 1972) a 
provoker shocked (provocation) students as they read a sexually exciting 
story. One group of subjects was told by the experimenter that they 
were aroused by the shocks and another group of subjects was told by the 
experimenter that they were aroused by the story. The present experiment 
differed from the above example in that facts were presented about the 
provoker's and not the subject's behavior. Also, in the present experi-
ment, the experimenter did not tell the subject that the recent events 
in the confederate's life caused the confederate's behavior during the 
game. The subjects had to make the attributions themselves. Post-
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experimental questionnaire data suggested that subjects did make a 
causal connection between the recent event and the confederate's 
behavior during the game. However, there was also evidence that some 
subjects attributed the confederate's behavior to another source. In 
a post experimental interview some subjects spontaneously said that 
they wanted to beat the other guy even though the directions stated 
that they were not in competition with each other. Since many subjects 
felt this strong competitive urge and attributed their own behavior to 
r 
a need to win, it seems likely that they could also have attributed 
the confederate's game behavior to competitiveness. The present experi-
ment did not provide evidence about which attribution was more powerful. 
A future experiment could determine the type of attributions that subjects 
made. This could be accomplished by having the experimenter make 
attributions about the cause of the provoker's behavior and then deter-
mine the effect of the attributions on aggression. For example, the 
competitive attribution by subjects could be increased by having the 
experimenter tell subjects that game behavior is influenced by com-
petitiveness of the players. The subject and confederate could also 
take a test of competitiveness and the confederate's score would be 
given to the subject. The confederate, of course, would have a fixed, 
high competitive score which, hopefully, would increase the competitive 
attribution by the subjects. The external event attribution could be 
increased by having the experimenter indicate the importance of outside 
events in determining game behavior. Following this statement, the 
experimenter could have the subject and confederate indicate to the 
experimenter and to each other important recent events in their lives. 
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Hopefully, subjects in this condition would more likely attribute the 
confederate's behavior to the external event. As was mentioned above, 
this type of experiment would differ from previous attribution-
aggression experiments in that the attribution is made about the 
provoker's behavior and not the subject's behavior. 
A third condition could also be added in which no statement 
would be made by the experimenter. In this condition the subject would 
make the attribution by himself. A comparison of the number of "zaps" 
• 
by subjects in the subject attribution condition with the number of 
"zaps" by subjects in the two experimenter attribution conditions 
would indicate which attribution the subject made (competitiveness or 
external event). 
In addition, the type of attribution that a subject makes by 
himself about the causes of a provoker's behavior is likely to be 
influenced by personality variables. Important personality variables 
which should be considered are: trait hostility, trait anxiety, 
internal-external locus of control, and empathy. 
SUMMARY 
This experiment was designed to determine whether level of 
provocation and attributions about the provoker result in differences 
in subject aggression and to determine whether differential cognitive 
appraisal or inhibition theory better explain aggression. Provocation 
was manipulated by varying the number of times (one or six) that the 
confederate used the zap option of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in the 
10 opportunities. Tne zap option takes money away from the opposing 
player at a cost to the player using the option. There were three types 
of attributions. In the ambiguous attribution condition, no information 
was given to the subject about recent events in the confederate's life. 
In the reasonable attribution condition, subjects overheard the con-
federate telling the experimenter that he was very worried because his 
wife had recently and unexpectedly been taken to the hospital for 
observation and tests. In the unreasonable attribution condition, 
subjects overheard the confederate telling the experimenter that he was 
very angry because the confederate's girlfriend had called today and 
broke tonight's date because she was sick. Aggression was measured by 
the number of times that the subject used the zap option in the 10 
opportunities. Anger was measured by means of a self-rating. This was 
a randomized group design with two levels of provocation and three 
dif.ferent attribution conditions. 
The results supported four of the five hypotheses. High 
provocation resulted in more aggression than low provocation. Subjects 
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~t only responded behaviorally to provocation as subjects did in 
previous experiments when provocation and aggression were defined by 
the use of shock~ but they also labeled the provocations similarly. 
Subjects' anger ratings increased from pretest to posttest indicating 
that they labeled provocations as an attack as they did in previous 
experiments. These results provided support for the zap option as a 
measure of aggression and as a definition of provocation. It was 
suggested that the zap option in connection with the Prisoner's Dilemma 
, 
Game is an adequate alternative to electric shock as an operational 
definition for both provocation and aggression. 
However, high provocation resulted in more aggression than low 
provocation only in the reasonable attribution condition. Level of 
provocation had little effect on aggression when used in connection 
with the unreasonable or ambiguous attributions. This finding and 
other similar findings point up the complexity of the area and the need 
to consider more than just the level of prior provocation although level 
of provocation is a powerful variable in and of itself. 
Type of attribution, however, was not an important variable by 
itself. Most previous studies have found that a reasonable explanation 
of a provocation reduced aggression when compared to an ambiguous or 
nonjustified provocation. However, these studies have been questionnaire 
studies involving hypothetical situations. In the present experiment 
subjects were placed in a situation which was intended to be life-like. 
It was suggested that differences in the experimental strategies seemed 
to result in different aggression responses to the reasonable explanation 
or attribution. 
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In order to determine whether differential cognitive appraisal 
or inhibition theory explained the above differences in subject 
aggression, anger ratings for subjects who used the zap option most 
(high aggressors) during the game were compared with anger ratings for . 
subjects who used the zap option the least (low aggressors). 
Differential cognitive appraisal predicts. that high aggressors would 
have higher anger ratings than low aggressors. Inhibition theory 
predicts that there would be no difference in anger ratings between the 
" two groups. Inhibition theory was supported. 
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Choice and Payoff Sheet for Subjects 
Choice Payoff 
YOU HIM YOU HIM 
Red Red $12 $12 
White Red $15 -$4 
Red r White -$4 $15 




Statement of Informed Consent 
I, ------------' by signing this statement 
(sign your name) 
indicate that I understand the terms and procedures of this 
• 
experiment and I freely volunteer to participate. 
APPENDIX C 
The.following are the hostility and anxiety scales from the Zuckerman 
(1960) Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist. 
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Name-------------
AFFECT ADJECTIVE CHECK LIST 
Below you will find words which describe different kinds of moods and 
feelings. Put an "X" next to the words which describe how you feel 
right now, that is, at this moment. Some of the words may sound ·alike, 
but we want you to check all the words that describe your feelings at 
this time. Work rapidly. 
1. _afraid 18. _frightened 34. _secure 
2. _agreeable • 19. furious 35. shaky 
3. _amiable 20.____good-natured 36. _steady 
4. _angry 21. _happy 37. _stormy 
5. __ bitter 22. _irritated 38. __ sympathetic 
6. _calm 23 .___Joyful 39. _tame 
7. _cheerful 24. _kindly 40. _tender 
8. _contented 25. _loving 41. _tense 
9. _cooperative 26. mad 42. _terrified 
-
10. _cruel 27. _mean · 43._thoughtful 
!!._desperate 28. nervous 44. _understanding 
12. _disagreeable 29. _offended 45. _unsociable 
13. _discontented 30. _outraged 46. __ upset 
14. _disgusted 3l.___J)anicky 47. _vexed 
15._enraged 32. ___J)leasant 48. _willful 




The following is the questionnaire the subject was asked to fill out 
about the confederate. 
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Questionnaire about the Other Player 
Circle one of the numbers for each question below. 
1. What is your estimate of the other player's intelligence? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 . 12 13 14 
Low Average Highly 
Intelligence Intelligent 
2. Do you agree with this statement? 
I would like to get to know the other player better. 
, 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
3. Do you agree with this statement? 
The other. player is emotionally adjusted. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
4. How did the other player feel during this game? 
Circle one number for each feeling. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Not Happy Very Happy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Not Angry Very Angry 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Not Worried Very Worried 
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5. Do you think the other player's mood influenced the way he played 
the game? Yes No (Circle one.) 
How? 
6. How tolerable or intolerable was the other player's behavior 
during this game? 
1 2 3 
Completely 
Intolerable 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Completely 
Tolerable 
1. How reasonable or unreasonable was the other player's behavior 
during this game? 
1 2 3 
Completely 
Unreasonable 





The following is the material given to the subjects for the pilot 
experiment. 
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In this experiment we are interested in the judgments that 
people in general make about behavior in a game. Imagine participating 
with a person, Sam, in a psychology experiment. In this experiment you 
and Sam played a game together to win real money. The object of the 
game was to win as much money as you can. There were 100 chances or 
turns for both of you to win money. On every turn you and Sam had to 
choose one of two moves, a cooperative move or a competitive move. If 
both of you chose the cooperative move, you each got 8¢ from the 
, 
experimenter. If you both chose a competitive move, you each gave 2¢ 
back to the experimenter. If one of you chose the competitive move and 
the other a cooperative move, the person who chose the competitive move 
got 10¢ and the person who chose the coop~rative move had to give 3¢ 
back to the experimenter. Neither of you knew what the other person 
chose until after both of you had chosen. -For this part of the game, 
you .each won about $2.50. However, there was another rule to this 
game. After every 10 moves, the experimenter said the word "Option." 
At this time both of you could push a telegraph key down. The first 
one to push the key down got the choice of whether or not he wanted 
to use the option. If one of you decided to use the option, this meant 
that you wanted to give up 12¢ of the money you had won to the experi-
menter so that the other player had to pay 20¢ of his money to the 
experimenter. In other words the option took money away from the other 
player but at a cost to the person using the option. Neither you nor 
Sam had to use this option. During the experiment with you, Sam used 
the option 6 out of a possible 10 times. His action took $1.20 away 
from you and it cost him 72¢ to use the option, that is, you both had 
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to return money to the experimenter but you had to return more. From 
what you can determine, the use of the option did not benefit Sam. 
However, before the experiment began, you overhea~d Sam commenting 
to the experimenter something about his personal life. Assume that you 
hear one of the comments on pages 3, 4, and 5. Please rate how reason-
able or unreasonable was Sam's behavior to you based on each piece of 
information. The rating scale for each piece of information is below 
the information. (Briefly look at page 3.) You are to circle one of 
• 
the numbers which indicates how reasonable are Sam's actions, given the 
additional information which you overheard. 
After rating the first one, go on and rate the second comment. 
Consider each piece of information separately. Do not carry in-
formation or judgments along from one situation to the next. Try to 
consider each comment on its own. Please reread all the directions 
again before going on to your task. If you have any questions, please 
feel free to ask them. If, for any reason, you do not wish to continue 
with the experiment, you are free to leave and you will be given credit 
for participating. (This is a standard procedure for psychology 
experiments.) Please reread the directions if you have not done so. 
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Additional Information 
RATE THESE STATEMENTS INDEPENDENTLY 
1. He is angry because his instructor sprung an unexpected, difficult, 













2. He is worried be~use the doctors at a local hospital haven't told 














3. He is very happy because he had just landed a part time job that 














4. He is angry because his steady date phoned and broke this evening's 














5. He is worried because a prof chose him and two others from a big 
class to give speeches about their reports for the whole class 



























7. He left a valuable article of his in a repair shop. He's worried 
because when he called at the appointed time, the repair man said 













8. He is angry because an.intimate friend while drunk spread rumors 















9. He said that he is a very competitive person and sametimes he gets 
carried away. He also said that sometimes his competitiveness 













10. He is worried because his boss at work has reassigned him to a 














11. He is angry because this guy who sits next to him in class always 
eomes in late and then asks him what has gone on in class. The 














For your second task, I'd like you to rank these 11 situations 
in terms of how reasonable or understandable they are. Put the number 
of the situation which you feel makes Sam's behavior the,most reasonable 
or understandable next to I 1 below. And next ,to I 2 below, put the. 
situation which makes Sam's behavior the next most reasonable; and so 
on until you have ranked all the situations from the most reasonable 













Your last task is to reread each comment and then to pick one 
of the six statements listed under each number which best describes 
how you would feel and act if Sam was taking money away from you and 
if you ove~heard each of the comments listed on pages 3, 4, 5. Check 
one statement for each number or comment. 
In doing this task, you might think to yourself - if I overheard 
comment one (or two and so on) and Sam then used the option to make me 
return my winnings to the experimenter, which statement below best 
describes how I would feel and what I would do. 
1. I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him __ _ 
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your .feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
2. I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him ___ _ 
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best describes 
your feelings.·) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
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3. I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him 
---
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
4. I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him ____ __ 
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn ··t show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
____ I wou~d use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
5. I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him ____ __ 
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
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6. I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him 
------
7. 
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
, 
____ I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him ____ _ 
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
8. I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him ____ _ 
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
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9. I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him 
---
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
10. I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him 
---
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
11. I would feel ~ostile and I would use the option on him ____ __ 
times. (Fill in the number if this statement best reflects 
your feelings.) 
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior. 
I would feel concerned but I would not show it. 
I would not feel hostile or concerned. 
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned. 
APPENDIX F 
Summary of Pilot Study Data 
Measures 1 2a 3 4b 
Mean Scores 
Ratingd 5.0 4.0 3.9 5.6 
Rank Ordere 6.0 3.5 5.0 7.2 
Total Scores 
Hostility 10 , 2 10 8 
Concern 10 22 3 8 
Option 4 0 3 3 
Note. N • 29 
~st reasonable attribution. 
~ost unreasonable attribution 
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for the 11 Different 
Situation Ntimber 
5 6c 7 8 
5.0 3.8 5.3 4.4 
7.3 7.6 7.2 6.0 
6 8 7 8 
10 3 10 11 
0 4 2 3 
cNo information given by Sam, ambiguous attribution. 
dLower the score the more reasonable the rating. 
~er the score the more reasonable the rank order. 
Situations 
9 10 11 
2.8 4.4 4.0 
4.6 5.9 5.9 
9 5 10 
8 15 12 
5 1 2 
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